By Qamar Bashir
Press Secretary to the President (Rtd)
Former Press Minister, Embassy of Pakistan to France
Former Press Attaché to Malaysia
Former MD, SRBC | Michigan, USA
The contrasting trajectories of China and the United States reveal a fundamental lesson of national development: civilian infrastructure creates lasting wealth, while prolonged warfare consumes it.
For decades, China concentrated overwhelmingly on economic development, industrial capacity, education, research, infrastructure and technological self-reliance.
The United States, despite possessing greater wealth and formidable innovative capacity, repeatedly diverted enormous resources toward overseas wars, military deployments and the maintenance of global strategic dominance. The consequences are now visible in their respective economic priorities and physical landscapes.
China has avoided a major, sustained kinetic war for nearly five decades. During the same period, the United States fought or intervened militarily in Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen and, most recently, Iran, while maintaining hundreds of military installations across the world.
This difference in strategic emphasis produced an enormous opportunity gap. Estimates based on Congressional Research Service figures and Brown University’s Costs of War project suggest that the direct and broader fiscal costs of American wars since World War I may approach $18 trillion in 2026 dollars.
The total includes direct military operations, post-9/11 homeland-security expenditures, war-related increases in Pentagon spending, interest on borrowed funds and present and future obligations toward veterans.
Even this amount does not fully capture the economic consequences of higher energy prices, disrupted trade, inflation, lost productivity or the lifetime costs of caring for wounded personnel.
Half of that estimated burden—$9 trillion—would almost equal the entire amount that the American Society of Civil Engineers says is required between 2024 and 2033 to bring the country’s major infrastructure categories into good condition.
The organization estimates that America faces a $3.7 trillion infrastructure financing gap over that period. Had only half of the historical war expenditure been invested efficiently at home, the United States could have closed that gap, repaired its roads and bridges, modernized public transportation, expanded healthcare facilities and still retained trillions for housing, education and scientific research.
More than 41,000 American bridges are presently classified as being in poor condition, while approximately one-third require some form of repair or replacement. Roads face an estimated funding gap of nearly $684 billion.
Transit agencies confront a repair and modernization backlog exceeding $140 billion. Water systems continue to lose treated water through aging pipes, communities still struggle with lead contamination, and electricity networks remain vulnerable to extreme weather, cyberattacks and rising demand. These are not signs of a country lacking resources. They are signs of a country that has allocated its resources elsewhere.
China made a different choice. It constructed the world’s largest high-speed railway network, extending approximately 48,000 kilometres, together with a vast expressway, port, airport, electricity and telecommunications systems. It developed globally competitive industries in electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, nuclear power, shipbuilding, telecommunications and high-speed rail.
It invested heavily in universities, laboratories, space exploration, satellite systems and advanced manufacturing. Its infrastructure became the foundation upon which industry, trade and productivity could expand.
China’s economic growth at the extraordinary 8–10% translating to rapid expansion transformed the country from a largely agrarian economy into the world’s leading manufacturing power. By contrast, the mature American economy normally grows between 1% and 3%.
This slower growth is not caused exclusively by military expenditure, but recurrent wars, growing debt and the diversion of public investment have undoubtedly imposed significant opportunity costs.
China has now extended its development approach abroad through the Belt and Road Initiative. Across approximately 140 participating countries, Chinese companies and financial institutions have supported ports, roads, railways, power plants, pipelines, telecommunications networks and industrial zones. Cumulative Chinese BRI investment and construction engagement reached an estimated $1.4 trillion through 2025. China is therefore converting national capacity into commercial access, supply chains, political influence and long-term economic partnerships.
The American model remains different. Washington generally supplies loans, guarantees, grants, insurance and technical assistance, leaving partner governments and private companies to construct and operate projects. Although the United States supports important ventures such as the Lobito Corridor in Africa, its state-supported overseas infrastructure programme remains much smaller than China’s. America’s most visible global presence continues to be military, whereas China’s is increasingly associated with ports, railways, energy projects and trade.
At home, the consequences of American priorities are becoming harder to ignore. Millions remain inadequately insured or exposed to medical bills capable of destroying household savings. Higher education can leave students burdened with debt for decades. Homeownership is increasingly beyond the reach of ordinary working families. Public transportation remains inadequate in many metropolitan areas, forcing households to maintain expensive vehicles.
Families facing high housing, insurance, food, healthcare and education costs often live from paycheck to paycheck despite working full-time.
Against this background, the proposed increase in American defence resources from roughly $1 trillion in FY2026 to $1.5 trillion in FY2027 demands serious examination. The increase is approximately $441 billion, while proposed reductions in nondefence discretionary programmes amount to only about $73 billion. Consequently, civilian cuts would offset less than one-fifth of the military increase. The remaining amount would require additional revenue, further reductions or new borrowing.
War costs are not necessarily included within the regular defence budget. When a new conflict begins, the Pentagon can seek emergency supplemental appropriations. For the Iran war, the administration submitted a package of $87.6 billion, including approximately $67.1 billion for military operations and weapons replenishment. Such emergency financing, when not matched by taxation or expenditure reductions, enlarges the deficit and ultimately adds to the national debt. The public consequently pays twice: first for the military operation and later through interest on the money borrowed to finance it.
Military capability remains necessary. China itself continues modernizing its armed forces, nuclear deterrent, navy, missile systems, cyber capabilities and space assets. No major power can ignore national defence. The real issue is proportion, purpose and strategic discipline. Defence should protect national development; it should not consume the resources required to sustain it. A military that weakens the society and economy behind it ultimately undermines its own foundation.
The Iran war may therefore offer Washington an opportunity for strategic reconsideration. America’s greatest long-term strength will not be measured only by aircraft carriers, overseas bases or missile inventories. It will be measured by the condition of its bridges, affordability of its homes, accessibility of healthcare, quality of its schools, reliability of public transportation and leadership in science and technology.
China’s rise demonstrates that patient investment in productive capacity can generate influence more durable than military intervention.
If the United States wishes to preserve its position, it must restore balance between power projected abroad and prosperity created at home. The choice is not between defence and development. It is between a defence policy that protects national prosperity and one that gradually consumes it.
