By Dr Lubna Farah
Renewed hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement are pushing the Middle East towards a more dangerous phase and testing Pakistan’s carefully balanced regional diplomacy.
Islamabad faces a complex challenge: protecting its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, maintaining workable relations with neighbouring Iran, securing maritime interests and avoiding direct involvement in an expanding conflict.
Tensions have intensified around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a crucial maritime passage linking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Reports that Houthi forces are strengthening their positions around Mokha, Dhubab and Perim Island have heightened concerns over international shipping.
With navigation through the Strait of Hormuz already disrupted, any sustained threat to Bab el-Mandeb could further damage global trade and energy supply chains. The consequences would extend far beyond Yemen.
The Houthis have launched missiles and drones towards Saudi territory, while Saudi forces and allied Yemeni groups have targeted Houthi positions. Attacks affecting Saudi cities and infrastructure have increased fears of a broader confrontation and threatened the relative calm established after the UN-supported 2022 truce.
The humanitarian cost is also mounting. The International Organization for Migration reported on September 18 that at least 112,000 people had been internally displaced, while thousands had crossed the Red Sea towards Djibouti.
Pakistan’s longstanding defence, political and economic ties with Saudi Arabia contrast with the geographical and strategic importance of Iran, its western neighbour. This gives Islamabad diplomatic access but leaves little room for miscalculation.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye has added another dimension to the crisis. However, collective defence commitments should not automatically mean Pakistani participation in offensive operations inside Yemen.
Islamabad must clearly distinguish between defending a partner, protecting shipping and joining combat operations.
Pakistan’s most constructive contribution could therefore come through diplomacy. It can hold high-level consultations with Riyadh, Ankara and Tehran, support UN-led negotiations, assist humanitarian operations and encourage confidence-building measures.
Islamabad could also participate in maritime-security initiatives and share appropriate intelligence without becoming a direct combatant. Supporting communication channels, including those maintained through Oman, may help contain the confrontation.
Pakistan’s policy should pursue three priorities: protecting its Saudi partnership, avoiding unnecessary confrontation with Iran and preserving regional maritime stability.
The decisive issue is not whether Pakistan has the military capability to intervene, but whether intervention would serve its broader national-security interests.
Through careful diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and defensive maritime cooperation, Pakistan could help reduce tensions while avoiding direct entanglement in another regional war.
