By Kanwar Muhammad Dilshad
The political, constitutional, and legal earthquake that struck Pakistan on December 19, 1984, remains one of the most consequential—and controversial—episodes in the country’s political history.
On that day, General Zia-ul-Haq’s government held a referendum asking the public whether they supported the Islamic system imposed by him.
In reality, the exercise was designed to provide constitutional legitimacy to Zia-ul-Haq’s presidency.
According to the Election Commission’s results, an overwhelming majority of the “people” voted “yes.” Those votes were interpreted as an endorsement of Zia-ul-Haq’s presidency, thereby extending his tenure by another five years.
Geographically, Pakistan occupies a unique position in the region, yet unfortunately the elite that has governed the system has seldom been sincere to the state.
A corrupt mindset and a tendency to obstruct every constructive initiative have been the defining traits of this group.
The constitutional architects of Zia-ul-Haq’s referendum included Sharifuddin Pirzada, Justice Rafiq Tarar, Justice S.A. Nusrat, and media figures aligned with right-wing political parties.
Earlier, in 1979, Zia-ul-Haq had introduced non-party-based local government elections, a system that continued until 1988.
General Pervez Musharraf followed in his predecessor’s footsteps by using the same referendum device to secure his presidency for five years.
Held in April 2002, this referendum is also widely believed to have been conceptualized by Sharifuddin Pirzada.
The Supreme Court played a significant role in granting it constitutional legitimacy. At the time, the Chief Election Commissioner and former Chief Justice Irshad Hasan Khan opposed the move and advised that, if at all, the referendum should be conducted through the Ministry of Interior—a suggestion that was rejected. The constitutional bench that validated the referendum included Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.
Our system has long been plagued by individuals whose flawed decisions have gravely harmed national interests. Today, there is an urgent need to overhaul the entire governance framework.
Pakistan is mired in corruption-related problems, with corruption being the single greatest obstacle to development.
Many politicians’ families reside permanently abroad; their businesses are overseas, yet their politics is centered in Pakistan. Such mindsets inevitably prioritize personal gain over national progress.
According to economists and institutions, the current economic growth rate stands at 2.7 percent. Investment has fallen to historic lows. The poverty rate has climbed to 45 percent—the highest in three decades—while unemployment is at a 21-year peak.
At present, there appears to be no political party or movement exerting pressure on the power centershe
The confidence displayed by these powerful quarters and the paths they are charting suggest they feel no pressure whatsoever. They fully understand the system and are planning far ahead.
As a first step toward reform, local government elections in Islamabad—pending since 2021—must be held. The background of Islamabad’s local elections has been deeply troubling, marred by administrative manipulation.
During Imran Khan’s government, the elections were postponed at a stage when nomination papers had already been filed and all procedures completed.
After the government’s ouster through a vote of no confidence, the incoming PDM government also obstructed the process by increasing the number of union councils, thereby disrupting the Election Commission’s schedule.
The Election Commission has now issued a final schedule, setting February 15, 2026, as the election date.
Meanwhile, reports circulating in the inner corridors of power suggest that the Ministry of Interior is preparing significant amendments to Islamabad’s local government laws.
It is said that Ahsan Iqbal is working on a formula to establish a 25-member Metropolitan Federal Council for Islamabad, with the Chief Commissioner as its chairman.
A mechanism is also being devised for the election of two members of this council.
Given Islamabad’s sensitivity, its governance should be exemplary and meet international standards. Only once the contours of the formula being developed by the Ministry of Interior and the Building Commission become clear, can any definitive conclusion be drawn.
At first glance, however, it appears that Islamabad’s local government elections may once again be sacrificed at the altar of bureaucratic and elite interests.
In Punjab, local government elections are expected in March 2026. The opposition has challenged controversial provisions of the Punjab Local Government Act 2025 in the Lahore High Court.
The Advocate General has submitted the provincial government’s position, stating that it has no objection to holding local elections on a party basis.
This suggests that Punjab may indeed witness party-based local government elections in March.
Local government elections in Balochistan, scheduled for December 28, were postponed on the orders of the Federal Constitutional Court due to the province’s harsh weather conditions, which made polling difficult.
The electoral contests in Punjab and Islamabad are likely to prove highly significant. It is reported that Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s candidates will submit their nomination papers under the platform of the Sunni Ittehad Council.
If Islamabad’s local elections are held on February 15, their results may well determine the schedule for Punjab’s elections.
Meanwhile, whispers in parliamentary corridors suggest that the proposed 28th Constitutional Amendment will introduce significant changes to the contours of Pakistan’s current Constitution.
Pakistan’s constitutional history has seen many ups and downs, and given its length and complexity, a full analysis will be presented in a future column.
Briefly, after the fall of East Pakistan, the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly was questionable. The Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 1970, issued in July by Chief Martial Law Administrator, President, and Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan to facilitate the December 7, 1970 elections, effectively ceased to exist on December 16, 1971.
Consequently, the very concept of a Constituent Assembly became ambiguous.
In this context, I once had a three-hour-long meeting with Pakistan’s Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman.
The off-the-record details he shared can now be disclosed without hesitation. These matters will be elaborated upon in the next column.
The author is Former Federal Secretary, Election Commission of Pakistan and Former Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Punjab
