By Iftikhar Mashwani
For nearly five decades, Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan has been shaped by regional conflicts, security concerns and the involvement of major international powers. From the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 to the post-9/11 war and the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan has remained deeply connected to developments across its western border.
A central element of this policy was Pakistan’s support for Afghan Mujahideen groups. During the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan became a frontline state and provided logistical, political and security assistance to Afghan fighters, with substantial financial and military backing from the United States, Saudi Arabia and other international partners.
At the time, this strategy was presented as necessary to resist Soviet expansion and protect Pakistan’s national security. However, critics argue that the prolonged reliance on armed non-state groups created networks and ideologies that later became associated with militancy, sectarianism, terrorism and political instability.
While Pakistan continued to strengthen its conventional institutions—including the armed forces, air force, medical services and professional bureaucracy—many Afghan factions remained organised around militias, tribal alliances and religious movements. This imbalance contributed to the weakening of state institutions in Afghanistan and made sustainable peace increasingly difficult.
Pakistan’s Afghan policy was never developed in isolation. International powers provided significant financial, military and diplomatic support during different phases of the conflict. After the Soviet withdrawal, however, Afghanistan was largely abandoned by the international community. The resulting power vacuum contributed to civil war and the eventual rise of the Taliban.
Following the September 11 attacks, Pakistan again became a major partner of the United States. It received financial assistance and security cooperation in return for supporting international counterterrorism operations. Yet Pakistan also suffered enormous human and economic losses as militancy spread across the border and violent groups increasingly targeted Pakistani citizens, security personnel and state institutions.
The long-term consequences are now difficult to ignore. A policy originally intended to secure Pakistan’s western frontier has instead contributed to continuing border tensions, terrorism, refugee pressures, illegal trade and strained relations with successive Afghan governments.
Recent security challenges have made the need for reassessment even more urgent. Pakistan has repeatedly accused militants based in Afghanistan of carrying out attacks inside Pakistani territory. Afghan authorities have rejected or disputed many of these allegations, creating a cycle of mistrust, border closures and diplomatic confrontation.
The central question is no longer limited to whether Pakistan’s historical policy was justified under the circumstances of the Cold War. The more important issue is whether elements of that policy remain compatible with Pakistan’s present national interests.
Pakistan now requires a decisive transition from informal influence and proxy relationships towards state-to-state diplomacy. Its Afghanistan policy should prioritise secure borders, intelligence-based counterterrorism, regulated trade, economic connectivity and respect for sovereignty.
Such a shift also requires stronger institutional coordination at home. Parliament should exercise meaningful oversight of national security and foreign policy. Decisions with long-term consequences must involve elected representatives, civilian institutions, security agencies and relevant experts.
Transparency does not mean publicly disclosing sensitive operational information. It means establishing clear policy objectives, legal accountability and institutional responsibility. The public should understand the broad direction of the country’s Afghanistan strategy and how it serves Pakistan’s security and economic interests.
Pakistan should also continue diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan. Geography makes permanent hostility impractical. Both countries share historical, cultural, religious and economic connections, while regional trade and infrastructure projects could benefit millions of people.
The lesson of the past fifty years is clear: short-term strategic influence cannot substitute for sustainable national security. Pakistan must reassess the legacy of its Afghanistan policy, strengthen parliamentary oversight, secure its borders and invest in economic resilience.
The way forward lies neither in political rhetoric nor endless confrontation, but in accountability, institutional reform and a realistic policy centred on sovereignty, peace and long-term regional stability.
