By Iftikhar Mashwani
The recent war involving Iran may prove to be a turning point for the political and security order that the United States has dominated in the Middle East since the 1991 Gulf War.
A recent analysis published by Foreign Affairs argues that the conflict has exposed the limits of American military power, weakened confidence in U.S. security guarantees, and accelerated a shift toward a more fragmented and multipolar regional system.
According to George Washington University professor Marc Lynch, the U.S.-led order in the Middle East was built around three broad objectives: protecting Israel, containing Iran and other regional adversaries, and keeping Arab allies within an American security framework. For more than three decades, Washington relied on military bases, defence agreements, arms sales and political alliances to sustain this structure.
The Iran conflict, however, appears to have shaken some of its central assumptions. Despite intense military pressure from the United States and Israel, the Iranian government survived and demonstrated that it retained the capacity to retaliate through missiles, drones and regional networks. For Gulf states, the more troubling issue was that they bore many of the consequences of a conflict over which they had limited influence.
This has raised an important strategic question across the Gulf: if Washington can enter a major confrontation without full consultation with its partners, cannot decisively defeat Iran and cannot guarantee that critical waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz will remain unaffected, how reliable are traditional U.S. security guarantees?
The answer does not necessarily mean that Gulf countries will abandon the United States. Washington remains a major military and economic power, and its partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and other regional states are deeply institutionalized. But those countries are increasingly likely to pursue a more diversified foreign policy, balancing their ties with the United States while also engaging China, Russia and Iran.
The Gaza war has further complicated Washington’s position. Strong American support for Israel has damaged U.S. credibility among much of the Arab public and made open cooperation with Israel more politically costly for Arab governments. The assumption that regional normalization could proceed while the Palestinian issue remained unresolved now appears increasingly difficult to sustain.
At the same time, competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has added another layer of complexity. Although both remain important Western partners, they have pursued different policies in Yemen, Syria and elsewhere.
This reduces the likelihood of a single, unified Arab security bloc operating under exclusive American leadership.
Lynch compares the current moment with the 1956 Suez Crisis, which became a symbol of the decline of British and French imperial influence in the Middle East.
The comparison does not mean that American power will collapse suddenly. U.S. bases, intelligence networks, financial influence and defence relationships will remain important. But the political confidence that supported the post-1991 order may be weakening.
This changing environment could create new opportunities for China and Russia, Pakistan ,while encouraging regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Iran and the UAE to follow more independent strategies. Fragile states including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen could remain arenas of geopolitical competition.
For Pakistan, this transformation could also create new strategic opportunities and pressures. Islamabad’s close defence relationship with Saudi Arabia, its ties with Türkiye and its military capabilities give Pakistan greater relevance in emerging regional security discussions. Speculation has grown that Pakistan could assume broader defence responsibilities in a future Muslim security framework.
However, claims that a new regional bloc stretching from South Asia to the Middle East is already taking shape under Pakistani military leadership remain politically sensitive and require careful verification.
Within Pakistan, critics increasingly link the concentration of state power, pressure on political opponents and security operations in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with a broader effort by the state to present itself as a stable and indispensable regional security partner. That interpretation remains contested, but it reflects growing concern over the relationship between domestic governance, military influence and Pakistan’s external strategic ambitions.
The larger question is what will replace the old American-led order. The United States may remain the most powerful external actor in the Middle East without remaining the only decisive one.
Washington also faces mounting economic pressures. U.S. federal debt has exceeded $40 trillion, intensifying debate about the long-term sustainability of global military commitments. High debt does not automatically place the United States on the path of the former Soviet Union, but prolonged fiscal strain combined with costly foreign engagements could restrict future strategic choices.
The Middle East therefore appears to be entering a new era. The old U.S.-dominated system may not disappear overnight, but its foundations are under pressure.
If Washington responds with diplomacy, collective security and political engagement rather than relying primarily on military power, it may still shape the emerging order. If it fails to adapt, the decline of American dominance could become one of the defining geopolitical transformations of the coming decades.
Author is Islamabad based Journalist, analyst and Editor, World 🌎 Tribune.
