By Iftikhar Mashwani
A major wave of Houthi missile and drone attacks on southern Saudi Arabia has placed the newly signed Saudi-Pakistan-Türkiye defence pact under its first serious test, raising questions about how far the three countries are prepared to translate their collective-defence commitment into practical support.
According to Saudi authorities, Tuesday’s attacks targeted civilian and economic sites in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran. The Saudi-led coalition reported that 73 people were wounded, while the Energy Ministry said fires and temporary disruptions had affected several energy facilities.
Saudi Arabia condemned the strikes as a dangerous escalation and vowed to take all necessary measures to defend its territory.
The attacks came barely a month after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed a joint defence agreement in Makkah on August 7. The pact declares that an armed attack against one signatory will be regarded as an attack against all three.
Although the principle broadly resembles other collective-defence arrangements, the agreement does not publicly outline an automatic military response or explain the specific obligations of each country.
That distinction could now prove crucial.
An attack on Saudi Arabia would not necessarily trigger the immediate deployment of Pakistani or Turkish forces.
Reports published when the pact was signed noted that no detailed mechanism had been disclosed for implementing its collective-defence provisions.
For Pakistan, the situation is particularly sensitive. Islamabad has longstanding defence relations with Riyadh, while the Pakistan military has extensive experience in training, security cooperation and strategic coordination with Saudi Arabia.
Türkiye’s inclusion gives the arrangement a wider regional dimension and creates the possibility of an emerging trilateral security framework.
The immediate question, therefore, is not whether the pact exists, but how its collective-defence clause will be interpreted if Saudi Arabia continues to face sustained missile and drone attacks.
The Houthis, who control large parts of northern Yemen, claimed responsibility for the latest strikes and described them as retaliation for Saudi military operations in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse the group of threatening the kingdom’s sovereignty and regional security.
The Houthis are widely regarded as being aligned with Iran, although Tehran denies directly controlling their military operations.
This creates a complicated strategic equation for Islamabad and Ankara. Direct military action against the Houthis could draw both countries more deeply into a conflict already linked to the broader rivalry between Iran and US-aligned regional states.
At the same time, the attacks demonstrate why the Makkah agreement could become strategically significant.
The reported strikes on energy infrastructure came as regional oil markets were already under pressure. Brent crude approached $100 a barrel, highlighting the global economic consequences of any prolonged disruption to Saudi energy facilities.
Geography also matters. Southern Saudi Arabia shares a border with Yemen, allowing Riyadh to respond through air defence systems, intelligence operations and cross-border military measures without necessarily seeking a wider international intervention.
For Pakistan and Türkiye, however, direct involvement would carry much broader geopolitical consequences.
Their initial response is therefore more likely to involve intelligence-sharing, diplomatic coordination, logistical assistance, air-defence cooperation or other forms of military support short of deploying combat forces.
Such an approach would allow Islamabad and Ankara to demonstrate solidarity with Riyadh while limiting the danger of becoming directly entangled in the Yemen conflict.
Nevertheless, the pact’s credibility will ultimately depend on how its members respond under pressure.
The three governments have already begun developing mechanisms for political and defence coordination.
The agreement could eventually evolve into a more structured security framework, but its practical scope will depend on decisions taken in Islamabad, Ankara and Riyadh—and on the nature and scale of future threats.
Saudi Arabia also faces a difficult calculation. Riyadh must deter further Houthi attacks without allowing the confrontation to expand into a wider conflict involving Iran and other regional powers.
The kingdom’s response may therefore provide the first meaningful indication of whether the Makkah pact is primarily a political deterrent or the foundation of an operational defence alliance.
Pakistan and Türkiye face different but overlapping concerns. Both have strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and strong interests in preventing instability from spreading across the Gulf and Red Sea regions. Yet neither country has an obvious interest in entering an open-ended military confrontation with the Houthis or, indirectly, Iran.
The latest attacks have consequently created the first major stress test for the trilateral agreement almost immediately after its signing.
If Riyadh responds independently, the pact may remain largely a political and deterrent framework. If Pakistan or Türkiye provides tangible intelligence, air-defence or logistical support, the agreement could begin assuming a more operational character.
A coordinated response by all three countries, meanwhile, could significantly alter the strategic calculations of both the Houthis and Iran.
For now, the main question is whether the Makkah agreement can deter further attacks without becoming the mechanism through which a localized Saudi-Houthi confrontation develops into a much broader regional conflict.
