By Qamar Bashir
Press Secretary to the President (Rtd)
Former Press Minister, Embassy of Pakistan to France
Former Press Attaché to Malaysia
Former MD, SRBC | Michigan, USA
The Strait of Hormuz presents a puzzle that cannot be resolved through official statements alone. Iran claims that no vessel can use the waterway without its authorization. The United States simultaneously says that its naval “wall of steel” is preventing ships from entering or leaving Iranian ports.
If both claims were completely accurate, the consequences should have become catastrophic. Iranian oil would be trapped by the United States, while petroleum belonging to Washington’s Gulf allies would be blocked by Iran. The resulting pincer movement should have removed an enormous volume of oil and gas from international markets.
After almost six months of war, however, the anticipated worldwide collapse has not occurred. Brent crude remains around $87 rather than $150 or $200. Transportation and insurance costs have increased, but most countries have not declared that their fuel reserves are exhausted. There are no universal gasoline lines, comprehensive rationing programs or widespread refinery closures.
The contradiction demands an explanation.Iran has demonstrated that its restrictions are not merely rhetorical. The United Arab Emirates says at least 15 vessels connected with ADNOC have been attacked since the war began. Several attacks occurred during August alone, producing deaths, injuries and operational disruption.
Saudi Arabia faces pressure at both ends of its export system. Iranian power threatens shipping through Hormuz, while the Houthis have declared a maritime embargo against Saudi-linked vessels around the Red Sea. Qatari LNG operations and tankers have also suffered disruption.
The United States, meanwhile, is preventing ships from entering and leaving Iranian ports. CENTCOM has intercepted or redirected Iran-linked vessels and says the blockade can be maintained indefinitely.
The EIA estimates that petroleum flows declined from approximately 21.6 million barrels per day before the conflict to 4.9 million during the second quarter of 2026. Recent private estimates range between 1.74 million and 6.98 million barrels daily. The reduction is therefore real and historically significant.
That produces another puzzle. If a Chinese tanker receives Iranian permission to transport Saudi or Emirati oil, the Gulf producer still exports its petroleum and receives revenue. The cargo also remains available to the world market. Iran would be controlling the destination—not blockading the oil itself.
Strategic and commercial stocks provide part of the answer. The International Energy Agency reports that observed worldwide oil inventories have declined by approximately 410 million barrels since the war began—an average depletion of 2.7 million barrels per day.
The global numbers are revealing. Supply has fallen by about 4.3 million barrels per day, while high prices and economic weakness have reduced demand by approximately 1.6 million. The remaining deficit is around 2.7 million barrels daily—almost exactly the reported rate at which inventories are declining.
This explains why the shortage has not yet produced universal rationing. But inventories cannot explain the whole system. Stored petroleum cannot indefinitely replace the enormous quantity historically transported through Hormuz.
Attention must therefore shift outside the Persian Gulf. The IEA estimates that production from the Americas has increased by approximately 1.4 million barrels per day during 2026. The United States is producing around 13.8 million barrels daily, while Canada, Brazil, Guyana and Argentina are expanding output.
Brazil, Guyana and Venezuela have collectively delivered the largest increase in petroleum exports from any producing region during 2026. Venezuela exported approximately 1.16 million barrels daily in July, including about 786,000 barrels per day to the United States—the highest American-bound volume since early 2019.
Russia remains another important supplier. Despite attacks on its refineries, it continues sending crude to China and India. Damage to Russian refining capacity can paradoxically increase crude exports because oil that cannot be processed domestically becomes available for foreign shipment.
Nigeria and Angola are supplying additional African crude. Nigeria’s Dangote refinery has increased gasoline and fertilizer exports to African countries deprived of traditional Middle Eastern supplies.
India has become an essential refining bridge. It buys Russian, Brazilian, Venezuelan, Nigerian and Angolan crude, processes it domestically, and exports diesel, gasoline and aviation fuel to Asia and Europe.
Qatari LNG losses are being replaced partly by the United States, Australia, Nigeria, Angola and Oman. Saudi Arabia moves crude through its East-West pipeline to Yanbu, while the UAE exports through Fujairah and uses shuttle tankers and ship-to-ship transfers outside Hormuz.
The functioning market is therefore not evidence that nothing has changed. It is evidence that the international energy system is being reconstructed while the war continues.
Every month of disruption strengthens alternative suppliers. Importers that once depended on the Persian Gulf are signing contracts elsewhere. Refineries are learning to process different crude grades, while investors are financing pipelines, terminals and offshore production beyond Hormuz.
These emergency arrangements may become permanent. Once countries spend billions adapting their infrastructure, they have little reason to restore their previous dependence completely.
Iran may therefore be damaging not only American allies but its own strategic position. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait risk losing customers and their reputation for reliable delivery. However, the USA and American and Western Hemisphere producers are gaining customers and influence.
This market transformation raises a question more consequential than the original shipping puzzle: was the redistribution of energy power merely an unintended consequence?
In 2025, China demonstrated that control of strategic resources could become a geopolitical weapon. Beijing tightened restrictions on rare-earth elements, processing technology and permanent magnets essential to American automobiles, aircraft, missiles, radar systems, semiconductors, robotics and industrial machinery.
The United States could identify new mineral deposits, but it could not quickly reproduce China’s refining and magnet-manufacturing ecosystem. Beijing had acquired leverage capable of interrupting American factories and defence production without military action.
Washington needed comparable bargaining power. China imports approximately 70 percent of the petroleum it consumes, much of it through vulnerable maritime routes. Oil and its transportation system offered a possible counterweight.
Before the Iran war, Trump demanded “total access” to Venezuelan oil. Venezuela possesses the world’s largest reported proven petroleum reserves. Iran possesses enormous oil and gas deposits while occupying the northern coastline of the waterway carrying approximately one-fifth of global petroleum consumption.
Senator Lindsey Graham later connected the two countries explicitly: “Venezuela and Iran have 31 percent of the world’s oil reserves… This is China’s nightmare. This is a good investment.”
Graham described American control of Hormuz as “checkmate.” Trump subsequently declared that the United States could open the waterway, “take the oil” and “make a fortune.”
These statements reveal a strategic philosophy. China possessed leverage over the minerals and magnets required by the United States. Washington could answer by acquiring influence over the petroleum and shipping routes required by China.
The official military objectives—supporting Israel, destroying missiles, preventing nuclear proliferation and weakening Iranian regional influence—remain part of the explanation. But they do not necessarily constitute the entire explanation.
The inquiry began with two allegedly airtight blockades and a strangely resilient oil market. It then uncovered inventory depletion, alternative suppliers, new trade routes and a historic transfer of energy influence away from the Persian Gulf.
At the end of that trail stands a larger possibility: the Iran war may be one battlefield in an American attempt to create energy leverage against China’s mineral power.
What appeared to be a war centred upon Iran and Israel may ultimately be part of a much greater contest over who controls the indispensable resources—and therefore the geopolitical bargaining power—of the twenty-first century.
