BEIRUT -UNS:A Lebanese military source has told Erem News that the scale and characteristics of the massive explosion that destroyed Hezbollah’s underground tunnel network in the Ali al-Tahir highlands suggest that the group may have evacuated a substantial portion of its heavy missile and air-defence assets from the facility before Israeli forces demolished the site.
The assessment is based principally on analysis of footage showing the destruction of the underground complex and the pattern of explosions that followed the initial detonation.
According to the source, Israeli forces used more than 1,100 tonnes of explosives to destroy the extensive tunnel network. The resulting blast produced an enormous fireball and a powerful shockwave, but the footage did not show the prolonged chain of secondary detonations that might ordinarily be expected if a very large quantity of heavy missiles, ammunition, propellant and associated military equipment had remained underground.
The absence of such secondary explosions does not establish that the facility had been emptied of weapons. Rather, the Lebanese assessment suggests that the weapons remaining inside may have been significantly smaller in quantity or different in composition from the arsenal previously associated with the site.
Evidence From the Explosion
A Lebanese military source told Erem News that the visual evidence is consistent with the demolition of a substantial underground military installation but does not appear to show the type of secondary blast sequence that could accompany the destruction of a major ammunition or missile depot.
Had extensive quantities of missiles and ammunition remained inside the tunnels, the initial explosion could potentially have triggered additional detonations as warheads, propellants, explosives and other munitions ignited.
Such secondary explosions could have included the sympathetic detonation of stored munitions, the ignition of missile propellants or the dispersal and subsequent detonation of individual weapons.
The source stressed, however, that the footage alone cannot establish the precise quantity of weapons present before the demolition.
The Israeli military had previously announced that its forces discovered dozens of Iranian-made missiles, projectiles and drones inside the network, in addition to anti-tank missiles, mines and explosives.
But, according to the information cited by Erem News, Israel did not announce the discovery of an exceptionally large stockpile of heavy missiles or major air-defence systems comparable with what might have been expected from a principal heavy-weapons storage facility.
Weapons Evacuated Months Before the Site Was Destroyed
The assessment of the blast reportedly corresponds with information provided by a separate Lebanese security source.
According to that source, Hezbollah began evacuating weapons and military equipment from the Ali al-Tahir network more than three months before its eventual destruction.
The evacuation allegedly focused first on the heaviest and most strategically valuable components of the arsenal.
The security source said the operation was conducted gradually and through several routes, rather than through a single large-scale withdrawal.
Some equipment was reportedly transported through underground passages leading to exits away from the Ali al-Tahir highlands. Once outside the immediate tunnel complex, the equipment could be transferred to vehicles for onward movement.
Other loads were reportedly moved through openings within the network that were designed to accommodate vehicles, with trucks subsequently travelling towards areas further from the frontline.
According to the source, beginning the relocation months before Israeli forces intensified surveillance of the area provided Hezbollah with greater freedom of movement.
The operation allegedly took place while several access routes, roads and tunnel exits remained usable and before Israeli surveillance and military pressure made large-scale movement considerably more difficult.
Where Were the Weapons Moved?
The Lebanese security source said the weapons were not transferred to one alternative central depot.
Instead, the arsenal was reportedly dispersed among several locations in southern Lebanon and areas further inland.
The principal areas identified were Iqlim al-Tuffah and Al-Rihane, with further redeployment reportedly extending through the mountainous belt encompassing:
– Al-Rihane;
– Aramta;
– Mleeta; and
– Jabal Safi.
Some logistical equipment and defensive systems were also reportedly moved towards the western fringes of the Bekaa Valley.
The apparent objective, according to the source, was to prevent the concentration of a large weapons inventory in a single location and to place valuable military assets in more difficult terrain away from the immediate frontline.
No independent evidence is currently available to establish precisely how many missiles or other weapons were removed from Ali al-Tahir.
There is also no independently documented inventory identifying the specific missile models that were reportedly stored there.
What Was Hezbollah’s Arsenal?
The reported evacuation must also be considered in the wider context of Hezbollah’s overall weapons inventory.
The group is known to possess a diverse arsenal including surface-to-surface missiles of different ranges, guided missiles, anti-tank weapons, attack and reconnaissance drones, rockets and air-defence systems.
Reuters reported in March, citing sources, that Hezbollah had spent months rebuilding its military capabilities and was estimated to have approximately 25,000 ready-to-use missiles and projectiles.
That figure, however, was an estimate of Hezbollah’s overall arsenal and does not represent the number of weapons stored at Ali al-Tahir.
Consequently, it would be misleading to interpret the reported 25,000 figure as evidence that thousands of missiles were necessarily destroyed beneath the Ali al-Tahir highlands.
Ali al-Tahir’s Role May Have Changed
The Lebanese security source further assessed that the military role of Ali al-Tahir had already been changing before the Israeli demolition.
Rather than continuing to function primarily as a major heavy-weapons storage hub, the facility had reportedly evolved into a more diversified military installation.
Its functions allegedly increasingly included:
– command and control;
– logistical support;
– protected movement of personnel;
– storage of selected equipment;
– power generation;
– accommodation for personnel; and
– support for fighters operating in the surrounding area.
The site also reportedly retained a defensive function, particularly in preparing for and responding to a potential Israeli ground incursion.
This distinction is militarily significant.
A missile can be moved from one storage location to another. A deeply fortified underground command-and-logistics complex is considerably more difficult to reproduce.
Why Iqlim al-Tuffah and Al-Rihane?
The choice of Iqlim al-Tuffah and Al-Rihane reportedly reflects their geography.
The mountainous terrain provides greater concealment and protection than many exposed positions closer to the frontline.
The mountain belt extending through Al-Rihane, Aramta, Mleeta and Jabal Safi offers rugged terrain, natural elevation changes and numerous potential locations for dispersed military infrastructure.
The areas also provide a geographical link between southern Lebanon’s operational front and the Lebanese interior.
According to the Lebanese military assessment, moving weapons deeper into this mountainous zone could reduce the vulnerability of the arsenal to direct attacks against frontline positions.
The reported movement towards western Bekaa areas would further increase geographical dispersion and reduce dependence on a single storage complex.
But dispersal also creates new military problems.
Weapons positioned further from operational units require longer supply routes. Communications become more complicated, resupply takes longer and the distance between storage areas, command centres and launch positions increases.
The Missile Is Not the Complete Weapons System
Military expert Brigadier General Ahmed Rahhal told Erem News that even if the reported pre-emptive evacuation of weapons is confirmed, it should not be interpreted as meaning that Hezbollah escaped a major military loss at Ali al-Tahir.
Rahhal argues that the strategic value of the facility extended well beyond the missiles and ammunition that may have been stored there.
The underground network reportedly combined command, storage, logistics, protected movement and operational support within one fortified installation.
In his assessment, moving weapons towards Iqlim al-Tuffah, Al-Rihane and other mountainous areas may have shifted Hezbollah’s military centre of gravity away from the immediate frontline.
But that relocation also creates longer logistical routes and greater separation between weapons, commanders and operational units.
The crucial question, Rahhal argues, is therefore not simply how many missiles were removed.
The more important issue is whether Hezbollah was able to move the launch platforms, command-and-control infrastructure, communications equipment, technical support facilities and other components required to turn stored missiles into an effective combat capability.
A missile stored in a remote location is not, by itself, a complete weapons system.
Its operational value depends on the wider military architecture surrounding it — including launchers, targeting information, communications, trained personnel, maintenance capabilities, command authority and logistics.
Strategic Significance of the Destruction
The destruction of Ali al-Tahir therefore presents a more complicated military picture than the spectacular explosion alone might suggest.
If the Lebanese sources are correct, Hezbollah may have succeeded in moving some of its most valuable heavy weapons before Israeli forces were able to isolate the area.
That would mean the destruction of the facility did not necessarily correspond to the destruction of the entire arsenal previously associated with it.
At the same time, the demolition of the underground complex would represent the loss of a major fixed military asset.
Unlike missiles, launchers and vehicles, a deeply engineered tunnel system cannot simply be loaded onto trucks and transferred elsewhere.
Reconstructing such a facility would require substantial time, engineering resources, manpower and freedom of movement — all of which could be difficult to obtain under persistent surveillance and military pressure.
Analysis: Tactical Evacuation, Strategic Loss
The available information points towards a distinction between weapons preservation and infrastructure destruction.
If Hezbollah evacuated significant quantities of missiles before the site was surrounded or placed under sustained surveillance, it may have reduced the immediate material losses caused by the demolition.
From a tactical perspective, dispersing the arsenal could also make it harder for a single Israeli strike to destroy a large concentration of weapons.
But the same dispersal could undermine the efficiency that a large underground military complex provides.
A centralised facility allows commanders to coordinate personnel, weapons, communications and logistics from a protected location.
Once those functions are distributed across multiple mountainous areas, Hezbollah may gain survivability at the cost of greater logistical complexity and slower concentration of combat power.
The destruction of Ali al-Tahir therefore appears to be less about a single missile count and more about the dismantling of a military ecosystem.
The central question is not simply whether Hezbollah still possesses missiles.
It is whether those missiles remain embedded within an integrated, resilient and rapidly deployable combat network.
The Unresolved Question: How Much Was Removed?
The most important question remains unanswered.
There are currently no independently verified figures establishing how many missiles, launchers, drones, air-defence systems or other weapons were removed from Ali al-Tahir before the demolition.
Nor is there sufficient independent evidence to establish exactly what quantities remained underground when the Israeli operation took place.
The absence of extensive secondary explosions may support the Lebanese military source’s assessment that the site had already been partially evacuated.
But it cannot, on its own, prove the scale of the evacuation.
Similarly, Israeli claims regarding weapons discovered inside the network demonstrate that military equipment remained at the facility, but they do not establish the size of the arsenal before the reported evacuation.
Conclusion
The destruction of the Ali al-Tahir tunnel network may therefore represent both a Hezbollah logistical success and a significant Israeli military achievement, depending on the level of weapons successfully evacuated beforehand.
If the Lebanese sources are accurate, Hezbollah appears to have anticipated the vulnerability of the facility and moved some of its heaviest weapons months before the final Israeli assault.
Yet the loss of the underground infrastructure remains strategically important.
The tunnels reportedly provided more than storage: they formed a protected system linking command, logistics, communications, personnel and military operations.
Israel’s destruction of that infrastructure could consequently reduce Hezbollah’s ability to coordinate and sustain operations from the area even if a substantial portion of the weapons themselves survived.
The final military balance will therefore depend not on the size of the explosion alone, but on what was removed beforehand, what remained underground, and — most importantly — whether Hezbollah succeeded in relocating the entire operational system required to turn those surviving weapons into effective combat power.
The Ali al-Tahir explosion may have destroyed the fortress, but the unresolved question is whether it also disrupted the military network that made the fortress strategically valuable.
