By Iftikhar Mashwani
Twenty-one years after the devastating October 8, 2005 earthquake, questions over the long-term rehabilitation of affected communities, the management of relief funds and Pakistan’s disaster preparedness continue to demand attention.
The 7.6-magnitude earthquake caused catastrophic destruction across Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of Islamabad. More than 70,000 people were killed, hundreds of thousands were injured and millions were affected, while homes, schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, livestock and other infrastructure were destroyed.
In the immediate aftermath, the Pakistan Army, government institutions, international rescue teams, humanitarian organizations and ordinary citizens launched a massive relief operation. The Pakistan Army played a major role in search-and-rescue activities and the delivery of relief to remote and mountainous areas.
The international community also responded generously. Japan, for example, announced US$20 million in emergency grant assistance shortly after the earthquake and deployed rescue and medical teams as well as helicopters to support relief operations.
Japan subsequently provided additional assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction, with JICA recording earthquake-related Japanese assistance of more than US$200 million.
Other international institutions also committed substantial resources. The Asian Development Bank, for instance, approved major financing for housing reconstruction and other rehabilitation activities, while the World Bank documented the significant challenges Pakistan faced in developing an effective disaster-response system.
Despite this unprecedented national and international response, many survivors have continued to raise concerns over compensation, housing, infrastructure, basic services and livelihood opportunities.
The management and transparency of relief and reconstruction funds have also remained subjects of public concern. Allegations of corruption and mismanagement have emerged at different stages of the post-earthquake rehabilitation process.
Such allegations must be examined through official audits, investigations, parliamentary records and judicial proceedings rather than treated as established facts without documentary evidence.
Questions over foreign assistance
One particularly serious allegation concerns foreign assistance reportedly intended for the construction of houses for earthquake victims in Swat. The allegation is that funds were obtained for the construction of approximately 400 houses but that the promised houses were not completed.
If substantiated, such a case would raise serious questions about the oversight and accountability of disaster-relief funds. However, the identity and role of any individual allegedly involved, the precise source and amount of the funds, the terms of the housing project and its implementation status should be established through official documentation before any person is held responsible.
Japan’s official record confirms substantial financial and humanitarian assistance to Pakistan following the earthquake, including grants, reconstruction financing and support for infrastructure and social services.
That makes transparency in the use of foreign assistance particularly important. Donor countries and Pakistani taxpayers alike have a legitimate interest in knowing whether funds allocated for disaster victims reached their intended beneficiaries.
The creation of NDMA
The 2005 earthquake also exposed serious weaknesses in Pakistan’s institutional capacity to deal with large-scale natural disasters.
The experience contributed to a shift from a predominantly reactive approach towards disaster-risk reduction and preparedness. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was subsequently institutionalised under the National Disaster Management Act, 2010, as the federal lead agency responsible for disaster management. Its mandate covers preparedness, mitigation, risk reduction, relief and rehabilitation.
However, the performance and capacity of disaster-management institutions have continued to attract criticism, particularly during subsequent floods, earthquakes and other emergencies.
The World Bank’s assessment following the 2005 earthquake noted that Pakistan lacked a comprehensive disaster-management system and that government-led relief efforts had struggled to provide timely assistance.
The establishment of NDMA was therefore an important institutional response, but the existence of an authority alone cannot guarantee effective disaster management. Preparedness, coordination, funding, accountability and rapid implementation remain equally important.
Have we learned the lessons?
The 2005 earthquake should have fundamentally transformed Pakistan’s approach to disaster preparedness.
It highlighted the importance of earthquake-resistant construction, effective building codes, emergency medical services, search-and-rescue capacity, early-warning systems, institutional coordination and transparent management of relief funds.
The Pakistan Army and humanitarian organizations have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to provide emergency assistance when disasters strike. Yet a modern disaster-management system cannot depend primarily on emergency mobilisation after a catastrophe has already occurred.
The real test is preparedness before disaster strikes.
For survivors of the 2005 earthquake, rehabilitation is not simply about rebuilding damaged structures. It is about restoring livelihoods, providing education and healthcare, ensuring safe infrastructure and resolving legitimate outstanding claims.
The tragedy also provides an important lesson about accountability. International assistance and public funds provided in the name of disaster victims must be traceable, independently audited and transparently accounted for.
Where credible allegations of misuse arise, they should be investigated without political considerations. If wrongdoing is established, those responsible should face the appropriate legal consequences. Equally, unproven allegations should not be presented as established facts.
Twenty-one years later, the 2005 earthquake remains a painful reminder of both Pakistan’s vulnerability to natural disasters and its capacity for collective solidarity.
The country cannot prevent earthquakes, floods or other natural disasters. But it can reduce their human and economic cost through stronger institutions, safer construction, better preparedness, professional emergency services and transparent governance.
The ultimate question is therefore not only how much was rebuilt after the 2005 earthquake, but whether Pakistan has built a disaster-management system capable of protecting its people when the next major catastrophe arrives.
