By Qamar Bashir
The recent initiation of dialogue between PTI and the broader political spectrum marks a
pivotal and positive step toward resolving political conflicts through democratic means.
This development reflects a notable shift in PTI’s earlier stance of isolating itself from
political actors it had dismissed as powerless, illegitimate, and lacking public mandate.
Previously, PTI sought engagement exclusively with the establishment, which it deemed
the true power holder, undermining the democratic principle that governance should be
conducted through civilian institutions and elected representatives. This shift suggests
that PTI may have received assurances from the establishment to support its demands if it
engages with civilian political forces, signaling a strategic recalibration.
PTI’s demands in these negotiations can be divided into short-term and long-term goals.
In the immediate term, PTI is likely to prioritize the release of its leader, Imran Khan, and
detained political activists, as well as the restoration of the February 8 election mandate,
which it views as critical to reclaiming governance in the center and Punjab.
However, PTI’s far-sighted demands focus on systemic reforms to strengthen democratic
governance, reduce military interference in civilian affairs, and establish a stable
governance framework. Key reforms include an independent Election Commission with
biometric voter verification, judicial independence through transparent appointments, and
institutional accountability. PTI also seeks to redefine civil-military relations by
confining the military to defense roles, removing military officers from civilian positions,
and introducing parliamentary oversight of defense budgets. Additionally, fostering
national unity through inclusivity, empowering marginalized communities, and
addressing socio-economic issues like poverty, healthcare, and education forms a
cornerstone of PTI’s vision.
Rather than seeking short-term concessions, PTI should demand the reversal of recent
constitutional amendments and legislative changes enacted by the incumbent
government. These amendments have drastically altered the balance of power, weakening
the judiciary, reducing parliamentary authority, and enhancing military influence. For
instance, the 26th Constitutional Amendment has increased parliamentary involvement in
judicial appointments and altered the process of selecting the Chief Justice, replacing the
seniority-based system with parliamentary discretion—a move widely criticized for
undermining judicial independence. Similarly, amendments to the Pakistan Army Act
extended the tenures of military chiefs, consolidating their authority, while legislative
measures granted the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) unprecedented powers of
communication interception, raising concerns about privacy and civil liberties.
Additionally, the government’s perceived non-compliance with Supreme Court orders,
including those opposing the trial of civilians in military courts, has further eroded
democratic principles and institutional balance.
These recommendations align with a concept paper I presented to PTI leadership in May
2024, emphasizing the importance of resolving political issues on political platforms
rather than relying on the establishment. The paper highlighted that PTI’s refusal to
engage with other political parties weakened its ability to build consensus on national
issues and reinforced a narrative that the military remains the ultimate arbiter of power. It
urged PTI to shift from isolationist rhetoric to meaningful dialogue, recognizing that
democratic governance rests on the strength of civilian institutions and collaboration
among elected representatives.
However, the feasibility of these negotiations remains uncertain. If frivolous cases
against PTI leadership and workers are withdrawn under due process, PTI would quickly
regain its footing and mobilize its supporters, potentially crippling the government
through street agitation. If the establishment remains neutral, the government might not
last more than a few months. Similarly, conceding to PTI’s demand to restore the "stolen
mandate" of the February 8 elections would immediately delegitimize the government,
leading to its collapse. Furthermore, undoing constitutional and legislative amendments
would strip the military and ISI of their enhanced powers, restore election tribunals,
eliminate military courts, and reinstate the judiciary’s full authority. These changes
would likely result in the government’s swift disintegration, as PTI’s restored position
would render it ungovernable.
Under the current circumstances, the government is likely to offer limited and calculated
concessions to PTI, aimed at placating the opposition without jeopardizing its own hold
on power or antagonizing the establishment. These concessions may include the partial
withdrawal of minor or frivolous cases against PTI leaders, the selective release of
detained workers, and symbolic gestures reaffirming democratic principles without
enacting meaningful reforms. Discussions on electoral reforms, such as biometric voter
verification or improved oversight, might be entertained, but any implementation would
likely be delayed. The government is unlikely to address demands that threaten its
legitimacy, such as restoring the February 8 election mandate or reversing constitutional
amendments that enhance establishment powers. These constraints highlight the delicate
balance the government must maintain—appearing conciliatory enough to prevent unrest
while avoiding concessions that could undermine its authority or provoke institutional
backlash. As a result, any offered concessions are expected to be superficial, prolonging
political instability without addressing PTI’s core grievances.
Interestingly, any or all concessions would not significantly dent the deeply entrenched
establishment, which has consolidated unprecedented power since February 8. For the
establishment, shifting support between political parties is routine. Regardless of the
ruling party, the establishment’s authority remains unassailable. If it chooses to remove
the incumbent government, it will do so decisively, installing a new party of choice and
supporting it until it falls out of favor. This cyclical process underscores the disposable
nature of civilian governments and the enduring dominance of the establishment in
Pakistan’s power dynamics. Without addressing this imbalance, any progress toward
genuine democratic governance will remain illusory.
