By Qamar Bashir
In a historic and unambiguous declaration, Professor Victor Gao—close associate and advisor of China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and Vice President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), one of Beijing’s most influential think tanks—publicly stated what analysts long assumed but never confirmed: China will always stand with Pakistan, in peace or in war, against any country that threatens its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“China and Pakistan are all-weather ironclad allies. No one should second-guess
this alliance between China and Pakistan. China will always come to Pakistan’s
help and assistance whenever Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity will
be threatened by any country.”
This was not a diplomatic flourish. Delivered on Indian television in the presence of
strategic commentators, Gao’s statement was a decisive strategic message, one that
carries weight not only because of his current position, but also due to his proximity to
China’s policymaking elite. His language left no ambiguity: the “any country” referred
to could be India, the United States, or any other actor contemplating actions against
Pakistan’s sovereignty.
Gao’s declaration came amidst heightened tensions following the Pahalgam terror attack
in India, which killed several civilians. India blamed Pakistan-based elements and
responded with missile strikes on Pakistani airbases, including Noor Khan and Murid,
according to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Pakistan reported no
major damage but warned it reserved the right to retaliate “at the time and place of its
choosing.”
China, rather than blindly supporting any narrative, called for a thorough, transparent,
and impartial investigation, aligning itself with Pakistan’s diplomatic stance. Gao
reiterated this position:
“We need to call for impartial and complete and thorough investigation into the
background of this attack, before any country should seize this opportunity to use
this attack as the trigger for escalation of tensions, or even conflict between India
and Pakistan.”
He cautioned against unilateral action based on conjecture or politicized assumptions:
“When you talk about terrorist attacks, you may know inside Pakistan, there have
been terrorist attacks against Chinese nationals. We actually lost quite a few
Chinese nationals inside Pakistan. But we always called for a thorough
investigation into what exactly is happening behind the scenes—who was pulling
the trigger, who was committing all these atrocities.”
This contrast with India’s rapid attribution and response has underlined China’s
preference for due process over punitive adventurism, but with a red line: Pakistan’s
sovereignty is non-negotiable.
Professor Gao’s statements are matched by facts on the ground. Over 60% of Pakistan’s
current military arsenal originates from China. This includes: JF-17 Thunder fighter jets,
co-developed with China, Yuan-class submarines, providing second-strike capabilities,
HQ-series air defense systems, complementing Pakistani strategic depth and P-10 and P-
15 cruise and ballistic missiles, enhancing Pakistan’s tactical reach.
Recent reports indicate the arrival of Chinese Y-20 cargo aircraft in Pakistan, allegedly
delivering defense equipment and signaling readiness for joint preparedness. This
growing military interoperability indicates that the China-Pakistan military alliance is not
theoretical—it is active and deepening.
Professor Gao underscored this in the clearest terms:
“You are talking about a war between Pakistan and India on the one hand, and then
you are talking about an ironclad alliance between China and Pakistan, and China’s
full commitment to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Professor Gao’s statements expand China’s security perimeter beyond its own borders.
By stating that China’s alliance with Pakistan would activate against “any country”
threatening its integrity, he has laid out a doctrine that potentially covers U.S. operations,
Indian offensives, or multilateral actions that challenge Pakistan’s territorial claims or
strategic interests.
This extension is not purely theoretical. China is already involved in several proxy
confrontations—with the United States over Taiwan and trade, with the Philippines over
the South China Sea, and now, possibly, with India over Pakistan. It’s no surprise, then,
that Gao warned of the catastrophic consequences of escalation:
“The deterioration of the situation between India and Pakistan is a reason for
great concern. These are two big countries, both armed with nuclear weapons…
the consequence will be too much for either India or Pakistan to bear.”
He warned against viewing such a crisis through a limited lens:
“This is the time for both India and Pakistan, and all other stakeholders, to work
very closely to get to the bottom of the situation, rather than allowing this attack to
be the trigger.”
Perhaps the most alarming yet underappreciated part of Gao’s message came in his
remarks about the weaponization of water—a real threat in a region reliant on the Indus
basin. India has previously threatened to cut or reduce Pakistan’s water access under the
Indus Waters Treaty.
Professor Gao minced no words:
“In the context of war, any stopping of a dam or the flow of the water causing
drought or loss of life in another country may be considered a war crime. In a non-
war context, any such action may be considered a crime against humanity.”
This was more than a caution. It was a legal and diplomatic shield, warning that Chinese
diplomatic and possibly legal mechanisms would be employed to protect Pakistan from
such strategic sabotage.
India must now revise its strategic calculus. For too long, Indian planners assumed that
limited strikes or hybrid warfare against Pakistan could proceed without triggering third-
party escalation. But China’s position has changed that permanently. The illusion of
unilateral maneuvering has been shattered. India now faces the reality of a two-front
military, diplomatic, and possibly economic counter-pressure.
China’s readiness to match rhetoric with resources is clear. Pakistan, fortified by Chinese
support, is no longer strategically isolated. India must ask itself: is it prepared for a
confrontation not just with Pakistan, but with Pakistan and China acting in concert?
Despite the gravity of the situation, Professor Gao’s remarks were also an invitation—to
de-escalate:
“This is the right time to call on both India and Pakistan to exercise the maximum
restraint and seek a peaceful solution.”
That call must not go unheard. With 1.6 billion people living in the arc of conflict
between the Himalayas and the Arabian Sea, the cost of further escalation is not
abstract—it is existential.
For now, the message from Beijing is unmistakable: China will fight shoulder to shoulder
with Pakistan if India dares to turn South Asia into a battleground.
Writer is Press Secretary to the President (Rtd)
Former Press Minister at Embassy of Pakistan to France
Former MD, SRBC
Macomb, Detroit, Michigan, USA
