By Qamar Bashir
On December 19, 2024, Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer expressed concerns about Pakistan’s development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities, stating that such advancements could enable Pakistan to strike targets beyond South Asia, including the United States. Finer described this progression as an ’emerging threat’ to the U.S.
In response to these developments, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on entities involved in Pakistan’s missile program, including the National Development Complex. These sanctions aim to impede further advancements in missile technology that could threaten regional and global security.
Pakistan’s current missile systems, including its longest-range Shaheen-III with a range of 2,750 km, cannot reach the United States, which is over 12,000 km away. The missile arsenal includes the Hatf-I, with a range of 70 km and a payload capacity of 500 kg, and the Nasr (Hatf-9), a tactical nuclear-capable missile with a range of 60–70 km.
Additionally, the Shaheen-II and Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) have respective ranges of 2,500 km and 2,750 km. However, none of these systems are capable of covering the vast distance required to target the U.S. mainland.
Interestingly, it is difficult to comprehend why the U.S., with its vastly superior and
highly sophisticated missile systems and formidable military might—far exceeding the
combined capabilities of the rest of the world—perceives Pakistan's missile program as a
potential long-term threat.
The US’s concern most probably stems from the progression of Pakistan's missile
technology, which demonstrates increasing sophistication and could eventually lead to
the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Additionally, the U.S. is
apprehensive about the dual-use nature of these missiles—capable of carrying both
conventional and nuclear warheads—which could exacerbate tensions in South Asia and
destabilize regional security, a region critical to U.S. strategic interests.
Another significant perceived concern could be the risk of missile technology
proliferation to countries hostile to the US or it could have stemmed from US’s
misconceived notion that this technology or expertise could fall into the hands of non-
state actors hostile to U.S. interests. Moreover, while Pakistan’s missiles cannot currently
target the U.S., their deployment in regional or third-party conflicts, or their potential
transfer to allies or adversaries, could directly impact U.S. forces or allies.
The US’s fears may be due to its perceived risks to U.S. interests in South Asia, the
Middle East, and the broader Indo-Pacific region. In South Asia, Pakistan’s missile
arsenal, particularly its nuclear-capable systems, contributes to heightened tensions with
India. This nuclear rivalry increases the risk of an arms race and potential conflicts that
could destabilize the region. Given the U.S.’s strong economic and strategic ties to India,
and its role as a promoter of regional stability, any disruption in South Asia could directly
impact American interests.
In the Middle East, the reach of Pakistan’s Shaheen-III missile, which extends to parts of
the region, raises concerns for U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and
Israel. The possibility of missile proliferation or use by Pakistan or its proxies could
endanger U.S. military operations and vital interests such as energy security.
Furthermore, the Indian Ocean, a critical trade and strategic route, is another area of
concern. Pakistan’s development of naval and submarine-based platforms for missile
deployment poses a potential threat to maritime security, including U.S. naval operations
and those of its allies.
Finally, the broader Indo-Pacific strategy also factors into U.S. concerns. Although
Pakistan is not the primary focus, its growing missile capabilities indirectly affect
regional security dynamics, especially with China’s influence in the background. In this
context, Pakistan’s missile program is viewed as a destabilizing force with implications
far beyond its immediate neighborhood, affecting U.S. strategic, economic, and military
interests.
The United States has imposed a series of sanctions targeting Pakistan's ballistic missile
program, aiming to curb its development and proliferation. In December 2024, the U.S.
sanctioned Pakistan's state-owned National Development Complex (NDC) and three
Karachi-based companies—Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International,
and Rockside Enterprise—for their involvement in advancing Pakistan's long-range
ballistic missile capabilities, particularly the Shaheen series. These sanctions freeze any
U.S. assets belonging to the targeted entities and prohibit American individuals and
businesses from engaging in transactions with them.
Earlier, in September 2024, the U.S. The State Department sanctioned the Beijing
Research Institute of Automation for Machine Building Industry and several Chinese
firms for supplying equipment to Pakistan's missile program, specifically for testing
rocket motors for the Shaheen-3 and Ababeel systems.
Looking ahead, the U.S. may consider additional measures to further impede Pakistan's
missile development. Potential actions could include expanding sanctions to encompass a
broader range of entities and individuals involved in the program, increasing diplomatic
pressure on Pakistan to halt its missile advancements, and enhancing collaboration with
international partners to restrict the transfer of missile-related technologies to Pakistan.
Such measures would aim to reinforce non-proliferation norms and address the security
concerns associated with the expansion of Pakistan's missile capabilities.
Given the context of U.S. concerns over Pakistan's missile capabilities and the sanctions
imposed, it is likely that future measures will aim to balance strategic objectives with
maintaining bilateral relations. The U.S. has significant interests in preventing missile
proliferation and ensuring regional stability but also recognizes the fragility of Pakistan's
economy and its geopolitical importance, especially in South Asia.
Sanctions are likely to remain targeted, focusing on specific entities and individuals
directly involved in Pakistan’s missile program, such as manufacturers, suppliers, and
research institutions. This approach would allow the U.S. to address its security concerns
without severely impacting Pakistan's broader economy or bilateral ties.
The U.S. is unlikely to pursue blanket sanctions that could destabilize Pakistan’s already
fragile economic situation, as this could inadvertently exacerbate regional instability and
complicate U.S. efforts to engage with Pakistan on counterterrorism, regional security,
and other shared interests.
By confining sanctions to missile-related entities and technologies, the U.S. can exert
pressure on Pakistan’s missile program while leaving room for diplomatic engagement.
This approach reflects a careful balancing act—addressing missile proliferation risks
without jeopardizing the broader U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which includes cooperation
on counterterrorism, regional diplomacy, and maintaining stability in South Asia.
