By : Ayesha Azmat
Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban is in serious jeopardy. Since seizing power, the Taliban have defied Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an anti-Pakistan insurgent group that has killed thousands of Pakistanis and aims to establish a Shariah-compliant state in Pakistan, has been given sanctuary as a result of this action, which calls the Afghan-Pakistan border status into question. Islamabad, which had assumed that the Taliban would be deferential to Pakistan in return for years of support, has been taken aback by this.
The Taliban are currently in power, but instead of providing Pakistan with strategic advantages or increasing its security, they have become a source of concern for Islamabad. This has serious implications not only for Pakistan’s security, but also for dealing with the situation in neighbouring Afghanistan.
But first, how did we get here?
Since gaining control, the Afghan Taliban has supported the TTP in dubious ways that have clearly harmed Pakistan’s security and interests.
TTP operational support:
The most important of these measures is TTP operational support and giving them a free field in Afghanistan. Over 2,000 TTP members were released from Afghan prisons shortly after the Afghan Taliban regime took power, after being imprisoned by former Afghan presidents Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan increased by 56% in 2021, following six years of relative calm in which annual attacks decreased. In total, 395 people were killed in 294 attacks that “coincided with the Afghan Taliban’s military offensive, which began in May 2021 and peaked in August 2021 when the Taliban seized Kabul” (PICSS, Isb).
Pushing for Pakistani concessions:
This effectively forces negotiations with the TTP to take place on the latter’s terms, and Pakistan must now deal with the facilitator of its talks with the TTP by leveraging relationships with one of its top security threats. This not only benefits the Afghan Taliban’s allies, but it also helps the Afghan Taliban establish a positive reputation as peacemakers, putting Pakistan on the defensive and preventing it from interfering in Afghan affairs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, dispelling the myth that the Afghan Taliban are Pakistani stooges may be beneficial.
The Durand Line Issue:
The Durand Line, a 2,640-kilometer border between the two countries that is otherwise recognized internationally, is the Taliban regime in Afghanistan’s third significant anti-Pakistani action. In a February 2022 interview, Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban’s acting minister of information, stated that “the Durand Line issue remains unresolved, while the construction of fencing itself creates rifts within a nation spread across both sides of the border.” It fundamentally divides a country (referring to the Pashtun ethnic-linguistic group).
Openness to engaging India:
The statement by Mullah Yaqoob, Taliban Defense Minister, desiring that Islamabad’s arch-rival India train Afghan troops, was of grave concern to Pakistan. Such an overture holds significant weight and represents a stark change in tone seeing as Yaqoob is the eldest son of the movement’s founder, Mullah Omar. It is thus a major blow to Pakistan’s decades-long policy in Afghanistan to have a dependent regime next door, precluding Islamabad’s long-term goal of using Afghanistan for its regional—and particularly its anti-India—agenda. If Delhi to train Taliban troops, this would mark the beginning of the end of Taliban dependence on Pakistan, and a major foothold for Indian influence on Pakistan’s western border.
Major implications for Pakistan
These factors have serious implications for Pakistan’s security. Historically, Islamabad’s primary concern with Afghanistan has been the latter’s irredentist claims on Pakistani territory (regarding the disputed Durand Line), which the Taliban are now leading. Supporting this revanchist stance would pose a serious security threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity, especially since the Afghan Taliban are already working hand in hand with the TTP.
Because the Afghan Taliban and TTP are both Pashtun, it is concerning that, while the Afghan Taliban continues to challenge Pakistani territorial integrity by rejecting the Durand Line, the TTP is simultaneously pressing for a reversal of the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Together, these efforts have the potential to mainstream the concept of a Pashtun-inhabited tribal borderland with a potential separatist movement. It also relates back to the Afghan Taliban’s dual strategy of facilitating Islamabad-TTP talks while simultaneously enabling the TTP, with both strategies aimed at maintaining leverage over Pakistan.
Furthermore, the Afghan Taliban’s interest in training Indian troops represents a significant setback to Pakistan’s decades-long goal in Afghanistan of having a dependent regime next door. If India accepts this offer, the latter could gradually become dependent on the former, and growing ties between the two militaries would undermine the very influence Pakistani strategists have worked so hard to build over the Taliban. Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy has thus failed to provide it with a puppet regime next door, as originally intended—what former US Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson dubbed Rawalpindi’s “Strategic Depth” policy.
However, it is precisely because of this context that the Afghan Taliban, in collaboration with the TTP, are now seeking influence, or “Reverse Strategic Depth,” in Pakistan.
